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AbstrAct. The 2000/2001 winter was exceptionally rainy in Portugal and between November 2000 and March 
2001 several floods occurred. In this period some localities registered the highest floods of the last hundred years. 
One example is the town of Amarante, in the north of Portugal, that has been affected by several flood events 
during the time frame previously mentioned. There is no reference of these episodes in the international disaster 
databases (e.g. Em-data, Darmouth Flood Observatory) because it is a very small scale event, and no fatalities 
were recorded. However, it is a recurrent situation with considerable direct and indirect damages which affects 
a small part of the cultural heritage centre which is also an important touristic and commercial area. 
The objective of this paper is to understand the characteristics of flood risk in Amarante which is a product of the 
hazard and the vulnerability of exposed elements (e.g. people, environment and structures) in order to improve 
flood disaster management efficiency.
The paper is organized into two parts. On the first one we add new data to the previous knowledge through the 
identification of flood episodes in two time periods, between 1937 and 1955 and from 1985 to 2001. Each event 
was characterized according to several parameters (e.g. flood peak, water height, flooding area, duration, and 
flow velocity) and classified into six levels according to flood magnitude (water height), flooded area (extension) 
and potential impacts (damages). This approach improves hazard knowledge and systematizes emergency re-
sponse procedures. It can improve the communication, not only between the different civil protection agents, 
but also between them and the citizens during the emergency. It can also be useful for assurance companies’ 
policy.
The second part is focused on the management of the March 21st 2001 flood which was the most severe in 
Amarante’s history at least in the last hundred years. Understanding the damages and the impacts of flood on 
livelihoods, the emergency procedures, as well as the articulation between people and civil protection agents are 
fundamental to increase the efficiency of flood risk management strategies and the determination of appropriate 
protection levels. 
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Introduction
Amarante is a small town on the north of Por-
tugal, frequently affected by floods. There is no 
mention of these events in the international dis-
aster databases (e.g. Em-Data, Darmouth Flood 
Observatory) as they are small scale events and 
no fatalities have ever been registered. The flood-
ed area is never very large due to the topogra-
phy of the valley, but affects part of the cultural 
heritage centre as well as a very important com-
mercial area. The flooding area is not large, how-
ever, it is considered as flood risk prone area in 
the Portuguese national scale in the Douro River 
Catchment Plan (INAG 2001) and in the National 
Water Plan (INAG 2001, 2002). 
In fact, disasters differ in scale between very 
large and somewhat smaller (OFDA 1999). 
However, independently of descriptors, size is 
a relative value and if Amarante floods have no 
expression at the international level, they have 
important impacts at the local scale. Even though 
no fatalities have ever been reported, losses are 
significant. Moreover, each time a flood occurs an 
emergency response is implemented which has 
inherent costs. The knowledge about flood risk 
and emergency management procedures can in-
crease the level of protection of people and goods 
and decrease the losses. Even for small scale 
events there is the need to coordinate efforts and 
efficient and effective countermeasure selection 
based on the evaluation of pre- and post-event 
strategies (Hansson et al. 2008) is necessary. 
The town of Amarante is situated on both 
banks of the Tâmega River and is located in one 
of the flood risk–prone areas of this drainage ba-
sin. Tâmega is an international river that can be 
considered as a middle–size catchment with a 
length of 184.02 km and a drainage basin about 
3,309 km2 most of it (80%; 2,649 km2) inside Por-
tuguese boundaries (Fig. 1). The annual average 
discharge is 70.31 m3/s and the average slope 
of the basin is 17.44% (INAG 2010). It is one of 
the tributaries of the right bank of Douro River. 
The catchment area in Portuguese territory has a 
population density of 92.7 inhabitants/km2, be-
Fig. 1. Localization of Tâmega catchment on the north of Portugal.
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ing, nevertheless, dominated by forest (61%) and 
agricultural lands (38%). The urban area repre-
sents only 1.5% of the surface. Until now there 
are no dams upstream Amarante but this situ-
ation will change in the near future. Since 1988 
there is a dam downstream of the town, which 
impact ends just in Amarante. 
The application to flood of different models of 
risk assessment have been proposed by several 
authors (e.g. Kron 2002; Jonkman et al. 2008; Merz 
& Thieken et al. 2009; Kreibich et al. 2009; Moël 
et al. 2009). However, all agree that risk is a combi-
nation of hazard characteristics and its probabil-
ity of occurrence, with potential consequences on 
the human and environmental systems. Kreibich 
et al. (2009) consider that flood risk encompasses 
two aspects: 1) flood hazard characterised by pa-
rameters such as probability and water depth; 
2) vulnerability often due to exposure and sus-
ceptibility of affected elements. Moël et al. (2009) 
introduced a new element as they consider that 
not only the exposure but also coping capacity 
makes up potential consequences. Nonetheless, 
the authors recognize that if exposure is easy to 
evaluate even if certain kind of indirect damages 
are still difficult to quantify, the definition of cop-
ing capacity indicators are not easy to integrate 
in risk assessment (Moël et al. 2009). The risk as-
sessment framework we proposed in this paper 
identifies two main components: hazard evalua-
tion and vulnerability assessment composed by 
exposure, susceptibility and coping capacity.
Although, the awareness of frequency of the 
flood hazard in Amarante is scarce the knowl-
edge of flood parameters is even more limited 
(e.g. duration, flood peak, flooding area, water 
height and flow velocity). However, it is a key 
task in flood hazard assessment. Actually, the 
availability of reliable and spatially distributed 
event parameters for extreme floods is a funda-
mental prerequisite for any comprehensive ap-
proach (Büchele et al. 2006). The implementation 
of the EU Directive 2007/60 on the management 
of flood risk requires information on flood haz-
ard as well as on flood damages.
Historical floods should serve as realistic 
reference scenarios for exceptional events. The 
consideration of extreme historical events can 
not only support flood awareness as realised sce-
narios (under historical conditions), but also be 
used as reference for the analysis of potential ex-
treme cases under present conditions (Büchele et 
al. 2006).
The 2000/2001 winter was exceptionally rainy 
in Portugal and as usual Amarante was affected 
by floods. On 21st of March 2001, the largest flood 
from the last hundred years, at least, was regis-
tered. This was the last event of a sequence of 
seven floods of different magnitudes and dura-
tion. In spite of Amarante history of floods, the 
vulnerability assessment done for the town is still 
poor. 
This paper identifies and tries to answer two 
orders of questions. The first one related with 
the flood hazard: when does a flood in Ama-
rante begin? How often is the town affected by 
floods? How many floods effectively happened 
during the 2000/2001 winter? The second ques-
tion concerns the impacts of these events and the 
emergency response: What were the damages of 
the 21st of March flood? Is it possible to decrease 
flood impacts? How can floods be mitigated in 
this consolidate urban space?
Answer to all these questions in order to im-
prove flood risk management in Amarante and to 
support emergency planning and an efficient re-
sponse is the main goal of the present research.
This paper is organized into two parts. The first 
one focuses on the identification and characteri-
zation of flood episodes between 1937 and 2001 
which could be very useful to create a database. 
Each event has been characterized according to 
several parameters (e.g. flood peak, water height, 
flooding area, duration, and flow velocity). 
The second part of this paper has insight on 
the 21st of March 2001 flood to systematize the 
damages associated in order to show the im-
portance of having an evaluation of the losses. 
Understanding the damages and the impacts of 
flood on livelihoods, the emergency procedures 
adopted, as well as the articulation between peo-
ple and civil protection agents are fundamental 
to improve the efficiency of flood management 
strategies and the determination of appropriate 
protection levels, in order to reduce vulnerability 
and costs.
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Data and methods
Until now no floods database had been estab-
lished for Amarante and the information is very 
limited for flood events characteristics as well 
as their consequences. The biggest events (2001, 
1939, 1909, and 1962, respectively) are recorded 
on the walls of some buildings where the height 
of the water had been registered. Although these 
are the larger events, other floods have affected 
this urban area during the 20th century.
The starting point to systematize the historic 
floods in Amarante was the data found in some 
qualitative research works (Costa 2002; Gomes & 
Costa 2004; Pedrosa & Costa 1999). These stud-
ies used information from newspapers and fire-
fighters reports. The reference period was 1960 to 
2001. In order to validate this information several 
procedures were adopted: research local and na-
tional newspapers to confirm and/or complete 
the information and hydrological data research. 
The fire-fighters reports were irreversibly dam-
aged and impossible to consult. The local and re-
gional newspapers were useful to identify flood 
occurrences as well as some elements related with 
date of occurrence, description of the flooding 
area and the local impacts. However, the descrip-
tions are merely informative, without a scientific 
purpose and presented two order of gaps:
1) flood data occurrence is sometimes identified 
by general sentences as “during last week”, 
“just before Christmas” or “two following 
days“, making impossible to identify the date 
of the flood peak. For example the newspaper 
Flor do Tâmega has a reference to the flood of 
21st and 22nd of March as the highest of the cen-
tury but the peak was on the 21st and the flood 
duration was longer than two days;
2) some of the descriptions are not precise, com-
prehensibly considering the purpose of the 
news, but making it difficult to extract data 
concerning water level and the flooding area. 
Some studies used an indirect quantitative ap-
proach (Pedrosa & Costa 1999), through the use 
of the maximum daily discharge from hydrologi-
cal stations upstream and downstream of Ama-
rante, to characterise the flood events previously 
identified through the press with the inherent 
limitations. 
The hydrological information from a station 
located on Amarante has not yet been used for 
research purposes. It is only available for two 
periods. S. Gonçalo staff gage, which was active 
between 1937-10-01 and 1955-01-13, provided the 
height of the water obtained through direct ob-
servation. One record of the height of the water 
per day was established and during the period 
of activity some changes in the daily hour of ob-
servation had to be reported. Only in a situation 
of possible flood, more values per day were reg-
istered, very useful to understand the flood pat-
tern. This information was provided by the Na-
tional Water Institute (INAG). 
Data between 1985 and 2001 were obtained 
from a limnimetric station belonging to EDP- En-
ergias de Portugal [EDP-Energies of Portugal] 
that is a private company. Its location is close to 
the previous staff gage. The data are registered 
continuously as a chart and a measurement of 
the water height is recorded hourly. Due to inter-
nal regulations, related to company policies, we 
have not access to the data for the whole period 
(1985-2001), but only for the already identified 
flood events. The consecutive floods during the 
2000/2001 winter affected the equipment and it 
was not possible to get continuous hydrological 
data after 26th of January 2001, although some 
sporadic data were available.
The data for the two mentioned periods, were 
the support to the definition of flood parameters. 
We used a topographic site survey to define the 
altitude of the different exposed elements as well 
as the water level during the flood.
For the period between 1956 and 1984 the 
only available data were those referring to daily 
average discharge for one station upstream (i.e. 
Ponte Cavez, with data since 1957-11-03) and 
another downstream the town (i.e. Ponte de Ca-
navezes with records from 1955-10-01 to 1987-09-
30). These data could be used to complement the 
qualitative information obtained from the news-
papers and fire-fighters reports. However, this 
information was not useful to characterize each 
event or even to identify the flood peak.
The costs related to the damages after 
2000/2001 winter floods are not available, and 
even the ones associated with the emergency re-
sponse have not been established. An important 
commercial area is part of the flooding area which 
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led the Associaç�o Comercial de Amarante [Am-
arante Commercial Association] to make, at the 
time, a survey to identify the losses of the shop 
owners and demand of governmental funding. 
In order to understand the vulnerability of 
the area, a survey was implemented during 2009, 
among citizens who were activ in the flooding 
area and experienced the 2001 floods. We ob-
tained 18 answers which represent about 30% 
of the people affected by the 21st of March flood. 
At least six shops were closed after the flood but 
not necessarily because of it. The questionnaire 
was divided into three parts: characterization of 
2000/2001 winter floods, flood management ex-
periences, and flood preparedness. It had single 
choice, multiple-choice and also rating scales (us-
ing five-point Likert Scale) questions. Descrip-
tive statistics were used to analyse collected data. 
Measures of central tendency, dispersion and 
cross tabulation were mostly used.
A target group of people from the municipal 
emergency service, who participated in the emer-
gency response of 2000/2001 winter floods, and 
an interview with fire-fighters involved in the 
response during the same period, were also im-
plemented.
the framework: flood levels
The EU Directive 2007/60 establishes three 
flood scenarios (with high, medium and low 
probability of occurrence) to support risk assess-
ment. Nevertheless, this approach is virtually 
inadequate to fully describe the whole range of 
flood events (Tsakiris et al. 2009).
This paper suggests a simple model of classi-
fication of floods in six levels according to flood 
magnitude (water height, flood peak), flooding 
area and potential impacts (Fig. 2). This approach 
has a double advantage. On the one hand these 
levels support diverse scenarios with different 
probability of occurrence. On the other hand they 
systematize emergency response procedures ac-
cording to flood magnitude, improve the com-
munication between the different civil protection 
agents, as well as between civil protection and 
the citizens during the emergency response. The 
Fig. 2. Inundated area associated with different level of floods.
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flood clasification can also be useful for assurance 
companies’ policy.
The observation of the Tâmega valley land-
scape allowed the definition of the beginning of 
a flood when the stream overflows the structures 
on both banks. Three exposed elements were 
identified: circulation areas (i.e. streets and pea-
tonal tracks), buildings (residential houses, com-
mercial and services equipments) and green ar-
eas (gardens, agricultural land and forest areas); 
each of them supports several economic, social or 
leisure functions.
In a flood scenario the first structure to be af-
fected would be the peatonal track on the right 
bank of the river. Its lowest point, with an alti-
tude of 62.75 m a.s.l., corresponds to the moment 
that a flood begins (Fig. 3). Nonetheless, the water 
level must rise 2.55 m more in order to affect the 
cellars of the buildings on the left bank of Tâmega 
River (Fig. 4). For local people a flood begins only 
when the river starts to affect these cellars. In this 
situation the losses are not yet necessarily high, 
however they disturb the daily life of people with 
stores, restaurants and coffee shops. This distur-
bance grows with the increase of water level.
Six different levels of floods based on the wa-
ter height, flooding area, potential damages on 
exposed elements, were defined for Amarante 
(Table 1). Each flood level has different likeli-
hood, impact, and implies distinct emergency 
response. The level VI shows a situation that has 
never occurred until now. It represents the most 
extreme potential scenario.
This model was defined in function of the 
Amarante flood risk prone-area. It is a simple 
and flexible tool that might be adapted to differ-
ent case studies and it is our purpose to develop 
and apply it in other territorial contexts in future 
works (i.e. in other scales, with different kinds of 
land use) in order to validate it as a tool to sup-
port flood risk mitigation and to create a more 
efficient flood disaster management. Changes in 
land use affect not only the exposure but can also 
affect the emergency procedures.
This approach has a double advantage. It inte-
grates flood hazard knowledge with the flooding 
extension and consequently with the potential 
impacts. It also defines the procedures related 
with the emergency response which are related 
with the magnitude of the event. It can also be 
useful for land planning and insurance compa-
nies as well as to improve the communication be-
tween the different civil protection agencies and 
between civil protection and citizens.
The problem of this approach is the compara-
bility between different places. This fragility can 
be eliminated by associating it with each of these 
flood levels a recurrence period.
flood events
flood occurrence between 1937 and 1955
The first indication for flood hazard can be ob-
tained by looking at how often floods occurred 
historically and determine their magnitude (Moël 
et al. 2009). Between October 1937 and January 
1955 (Table 2, 3) the data available indicated 98 
floods in Amarante covering the period of 387 
Fig. 3. Tâmega River – Peatonal track on the right river bank.
Source: Amarante City Hall (http://www.cm-amarante.pt/).
Fig. 4. Floods of level II affect the buildings cellars on the 
left bank.
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Overflow of the fluvial 
beach and circulation 
structures, on the right 
bank of Tâmega River.
Damages: Interruption of the 
utilization of exposed structures 
which affects leisure.
potential losses and costs:
Limited – Cleaning of the river 
bank; reconstruction of small 
damages on support walls.
– Alert of beginning of flood
– Interdiction of people circula-
tion on a part of the right bank of 
the river;
– Monitoring river water level;
– Follow the meteorological 
forecasts;








Water begins to affect the 
cellars of the buildings 
on left bank.
On the right bank the 
access to the walkway is 
completely blocked.
Damages: Some cellars are inun-
dated, some products could be 
destroyed.
potential losses and costs:
Limited – Mitigation of losses 
through convenient information 
is possible and still limited.
Cleaning procedures.
– Active surveillance made by 
the civil protection agents that 
need to pay attention to the pre-
cipitation forecasts and monitor-
ing water height;
– Making restrictions to car park-
ing on the right and left river 
banks;
– Launch a warning to the 
citizens and maintain them 
informed about the possibility of 
an increase in the water level;
– Emergency requires an active 
intervention of the citizens in the 
protection of their own goods. 
Citizens need to safeguard the 








On the left bank water 
completely flooded the 
cellars, a street (Av.ª 
Beira Rio) and a garden 
(Jardim Amadeu de 
Sousa Cardozo.)
The water rise by the 
sewages and begins to 
affect the lower part of 
the square called Largo 
do Arquinho.
On the right bank the 
water height increase 
over the flooded infra-
structures.
Damages: The same as the previ-
ous level although the water 
height is higher. Probably the 
losses of the goods inside the 
buildings could increase.
potential losses and costs:
The level of losses is related with 
the preparedness and coping 
capacity of the citizens;
Cleaning procedures.
– Launch a warning of “danger-
ous flood”;
– Advice people to protect their 
belongings;
– People with shops on the 31 
de Janeiro street and Largo do 
Arquinho need to safeguard the 
products and equipments;
– Civil protection agents must 
maintain citizens informed with 
forecasts of water height. They 
must be prepared to help the 
citizens and to begin evacuation 
if the water continues to raise;








The flooding area en-
larges.
On the left river bank the 
water reaches up to 0.50 
cm on the 31 de Janeiro 
street and inundates the 
square called Largo do 
Arquinho,
All the commercial area 
is flooded.
On the right river bank 
the water flooded the 
lower part of the car 
parking.
Damages: Destruction of 
products and restrictions to the 
commercial activity on both river 
banks.
potential losses and costs:
Could be important but are re-
lated with the preparedness and 
copying capacity of the citizens.
Cleaning procedures.
– The civil protection agents 
inform and help affected people;
– People living in inundation 
area have to be evacuated;
– People save their goods and 
some of them need help from the 
authorities to find a place to store 
their belongings;
– Maintenance of security 
perimeter and restrict the access 
and facilitate the evacuation of 
people and goods from the area.
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days. Presenting these data in one year frame, on 
average 22 days of floods were registered. Most 
of them (89.8%) reached only the level I on the 
proposed scale, and occurred every year. The 
water height can be variable and reach between 
a few centimeters up to approximately 2.40 m. 
In fact, most of level I floods (n=64) presented a 
water height lower than 1 m. The damages were 
very restricted and were mainly related to the in-
terruption of the utilization of exposed structures 
which affect leisure. The mean duration of level I 
floods was 3 days, but may vary from less than a 
day up to 30 days. Actually, most of these events 











The river floods the 
main commercial area 
with more than 0.50 m 
water height on the 31 
de Janeiro and Largo do 
Arquinho.
Most of the ground-
floor of the buildings is 
entirely affected.
On the left river bank 
the first and second floor 
of the market is flooded 
including some shops. 
The camping located in 
this bank is also flooded 
as well as the restaurant 
inside it.
Damages: Destruction of the 
products and equipments inside 
stores, coffee shops and restau-
rants.
The buildings can suffer dam-
ages even in the structure.
potential losses and costs: Can 
be very high but will depend of 
the preparedness of the citizens 
and the capacity to anticipate 
and to cope of the civil protec-
tion agents and citizens.
Cleaning measures.
– Evacuation of all local people;
– Monitoring the level of the 
water;
– Maintenance of security perim-
eter and restrict the access;






The water height reached 
a record level never 
known.
The first floor of the 
buildings area affected.
Damages: Destruction of the 
products and equipments inside 
stores, coffee shops, restaurants 
and homes.
The buildings can suffer dam-
ages even to the structure.
potential losses and costs: Can 
be very high but will depend of 
the preparedness of the citizens 
and the capacity to anticipate 
and to cope of the civil protec-
tion agents and citizens.
– Maintenance of security perim-
eter and restrict the access;
– Preserve the security in the 
area.
Table 1. Cont.
Fig. 5. January 1948 flood.
Source: Data from the National Water Institute (INAG).
Fig. 6. January 1939 flood.
Source: Data from the National Water Institute (INAG).
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flooding area on these events is not very large 
(Fig. 2). 
During the analyzed period only in 8 years 
floods on a level II or higher were observed (Ta-
ble 4), with duration between 1 and 31 days. 
However, in most cases floods not reached the 
level II for more than 2 days. 
Only one level III flood was registered during 
this period, beginning on January 25th 1948 and 
lasting until February 2nd of the same year. The 
flood holded level III for less than a day and level 
II for less than 2 days. The peak was reached on 
January 28th (Fig. 5).
The flood that reached level V happened on 
the 16th of January 1939. It had the duration of 20 
days and begun on January 14th and ended on 
February 2nd (Fig. 6). Nevertheless, only during 
three days it reached level II or higher. It is pos-
sible to conclude that highest levels of flood have 
a short duration. During this event it is possible 
to identify three flood peaks.
Between 1937 and 1955 the flood season was 
very large. The earliest occurrence was registered 
on October 14th 1939 and the latest one on June 


















level of flood 
classification
1937/38 3 10 63.55 1 0.80 I
1938/39 6 27 70.95 3 8.20 V
1939/40 10 32 66.15 4 3.40 II
1940/41 7 61 66.55 5 3.80 II
1941/42 5 7 64.55 1 1.80 I
1942/43 3 34 64.95 3 2.20 I
1943/44 3 11 64.95 2 2.20 I
1944/45 2 3 63.05 2 0.30 I
1945/46 8 25 65.15 5 2.40 I
1946/47 7 69 66.20 12 3.50 II
1947/48* 5 19 67.75 3 5.00 III
1948/49 4 7 64.95 1 2.20 I
1949/50 5 10 64.80 3 2.05 I
1950/51 9 35 66.95 6 4.20 II
1951/52 7 14 66.95 2 4.20 II
1952/53 5 12 64.35 1 1.60 I
1953/54 5 7 63.35 1 0.60 I
1954/55 4 4 66.05 1 3.30 II
Total 98 387
* There are no records for February and March
Source: Data from S. Gonçalo staff gorge belonging to the National Water Institute (INAG)
Table 3. Flood events in relation to the classification 
level in each year
hydrological 
year
total of flood 
events
flood level
I II III IV V
1937/38 3 3
1938/39 6 5 1
1939/40 10 9 1






1946/47 7 6 1
1947/48* 5 4 1
1948/49 4 4
1949/50 5 5
1950/51 9 8 1
1951/52 7 6 1
1952/53 5 5
1953/54 5 5
1954/55 4 3 1
Total 98 87 8 1 0 1
* There are no records for February and March
Source: Data from S. Gonçalo staff gorge belonging to the National 
Water Institute (INAG)
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8th 1946. Both reached only level I. Floods with 
higher magnitude occurred in January and Feb-
ruary but two level II floods were also registered 
in November. The highest flood of this period oc-
curred in January 1939. The occurrence of floods 
during spring was not an extraordinary situation 
because 19 events happened in 8 years (1939, 
1941, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947, 1952, 1953 and 1954). 
They were all of level I. 
Concerning the rise of water level, the maxi-
mum registered increase was 0.95 m/hour, at-
tained during the flood of 16th of January 1939. 
The drop of the water level was slower and the 
highest value reached, 0.34 m/hour, recorded 
during the same flood.
flood occurrence between 1956 and 1984
During this analyzed period no local hydro-
metric data were recorded. The only identified 
flood reached the peak on 1st of April 1962, reg-
istered on the wall of some buildings, because it 
was one of the biggest events that have affected 
Amarante. It reached level V but the water height 
was lower than the one registered during the 
flood 1939-01-16. 
Twelve floods were possible to be identified 
on the base of newspapers records (Table 5). 
However, descriptions made by journalists do 
not always present enough elements to support 
the classification of these events into levels. 
flood occurrence between 1985 and 2001
From the data provided by EDP it was pos-
sible to identify 11 floods of level II or higher 
with different duration and water height from 
October 1985 until March 2001 (Table 6). Some 
of them present more than one peak (Fig. 7). In 
the current research the data for the occurrence 
of level I floods was not available for the reasons 
explained above.
The 2000/2001 winter was an exceptional 
period due to the number of floods, their long 
time duration, and also because of the number of 
events with a level higher than II. Newspapers 
and citizens identify the 7th of December and the 
5th of January floods as two different events. Nev-
ertheless, they are peaks of the same event (Fig. 
8). Considering these two dates as a single event, 
six episodes were registered. The last one was the 
biggest of at least the last hundred years.
This flood season began on the 2nd of Novem-
ber with a level I event with duration of 13 hours. 
During this month six more floods of level I oc-
Table 4. Duration of flood events
flood duration (days)
number of floods by level 
level I level II level III level IV level V
total
number % number %  number % number % number %
<=1 42 42.86 1 1.02 43
2 a 5 36 36.73 2 2.04 38
6 a 9 5 5.10 1 1.02 6
10 a 14 3 3.06 2 2.04 5
15 a 19 1 1.02 1 1.02 2
20 or more 1 1.02 2 2.04 1 1.02 4
Total 88 89.80 8 8.16 1 1.02 1 1.02 98
Source: Data from the National Water Institute (INAG)
Table 5. Flood occurrence between 1956 and 1984
Date of flood peak flood level
17th of November 1960 Level IV
1st of April 1962 Level V l
9th of January 1963 Level II
22nd of January 19661,2 Level III
12th of February 19662 No data  available
20th of February 19662 No data  available
17th of March 1969 Level III
11th of February 1972 Level III or IV
28th February 1978 Level IV
Between 21st and 27th of December 
19783 Level III
7th of February 1979 Level V
30th of December 1981 Level III
Source: Data from the National Water Institute (INAG); 1 – Costa 
(2002); 2 – Newspapers were not available; 3 – The newspapers do 
not identify the day of the peak flood
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curred, some of them with very short duration 
(e.g. the flood on 13th of November lasted for only 
2 hours). On 5th of November the water height be-
gan to rise again and reached level II on the fol-
lowing day. The water height increased reaching 
3.68 m. The flood duration was 43 hours but only 
during 3 hours maintained on level II. It is pos-
sible to say that since 30th of November 2000 to 
5th of January 2001 the water height maintained 
level I with small and short duration episodes of 
level II (i.e. 5th, 10th, 30th of December and 1st, 2nd 
and 4th of January). In this case we can consider 
that is only the same event with two peaks (i.e. 7th 
of December 2000 and 5th of January 2001). Pos-
sibly this situation continued for more days af-
ter the 5th of January flood but there are no data 
available to prove it. The 7th of December flood 
reached level III, however higher events occurred 
after and on the 21st of March happened the high-
est event recorded in the last hundred years. 
Even for floods in the same level the water 
height may vary, that has different impacts on 
the exposed elements.
The discharge capacity is an important pa-
rameter that can also contribute in the increase 
of losses. A more rapid rise of the water implies 
less time for people to cope. There is a great vari-
ability of flow velocity and for this period the 
values found were higher than the ones found 
in 1937–1955. In December 2000 when the water 
level rose, the flow velocity was 0.92 and 0.98 
 mh-1. Moreover, the maximum value of flow ve-
locity calculated when the water level rose was 
1.35 mh–1 on the 2nd of January 1996 flood. The 
highest value of discharge capacity, when the 
water descends, was registered during the 6th of 
November 2000 flood.
Table 6. Flood events of level II or higher from 1985 until 2001
Date of flood peak flood level flood duration highest water level (m a.s.l.)
21st of December 19891 Level III 13 days and 18 hours 4.89
4th of December 19921 Level II 4 days and 2 hours 4.18
6th of January 19941 Level II 12 days and 16 hours 3.96
2nd of January 19961 Level III 41 days and 12 hours 5.12
6th of November 20001 Level II 2 days and 7 hours 3.68
7th of December 20001 Level III At least 35 days and 13 
hours
4.90
5th of January 20012, 6 Level IV (at least) 5.892
26th of January 20012 Level IV Not available 5.892
7 th of February 20014 Level II or III Not available 2.562
4 th of March 2001 Level IV Not available 5.893
21st of March 20015 Level V Not available 8.31
Source: 1 – Data from EDP; 2 – This values are estimated. Due to a failure in the equipment the data was only available until 10 a.m. 5th of 
January; 3 – This value was estimated from the newspaper descriptions; 4 – It was not found any news about this event in the newspapers. 
The EDP records are not conclusive about the peak of this event because of a failure in the equipment; 5 – This value is registered on the 
wall; 6 – Began 30th of November 2000 until, 5th of January 2001 (at least)
Fig. 7. December and January 1995 flood.
Source: Data from EDP – Energias de Portugal.
Fig. 8. 26th of November 2000 until 5th of January 2001 flood.
Source: Data from EDP.
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Also the moment of the day when the flood 
peak happens can influence the amount of dam-
ages. It has impact on the level of surveillance, 
namely of the citizens and, consequently, on the 
readiness to cope. In the lower floor most of the 
buildings are occupied by stores, restaurants and 
coffee shops. Only on the first or upper floors 
there are residences. Most of the shops owners 
do not live in the area which makes the reception 
and consequently, the response, on the warning 
difficult. For instance, in the case of the highest 
floods (i.e. 16th of January 1939 and 21st of March 
2001), the flood peak occurred during the night. 
Even though a flood always causes disturbanc-
es in the people daily lives as well as damages, 
depending on the season those can be aggravated 
(e.g. Christmas and Carnival). Many floods af-
fected the area on Christmas and New Year when 
the shops have more products and there was an 
increase in commercial activity which could diffi-
cult the level of preparedness and increasing the 
damages. The analysis of the flood parameters 
previously described seems important to support 
a better emergency planning. 
the 21st of march 2001 flood 
management
During the 2000/2001 winter several stores, 
coffee shops and restaurants suffered damages 
as consequence of floods. Nevertheless, the most 
severe event occurred on 21st of March 2001. 
Although the area inundated was small (21 ha) 
(Fig. 9) and the number of people affected was 
reduced (about 100 persons1), the direct losses 
recorded were established on 1.3 million Euros2. 
This assessment was made by the Associaç�o Co-
mercial de Amarante [Amarante Commercial As-
sociation], through a survey was prepared only 
for the purpose of requesting financial assistance 
from the Portuguese government. The effective 
losses of this event are unknown. In the survey, 
made in 2001, 67 shops with very different lev-
els of damages were recorded (Fig. 10, Table 7). 
Damages result from the proximity of the river, 
but also from other factors like the quality of 
1 This value was calculated using the 2001 Census.
2 Evaluation of the Associaç�o Comercial de Amarante 
[Amarante Commercial Association]
stored goods (e.g. some shops had heavy, fragile 
equipment, very difficult to move away), and the 
preventive measures adopted before the flood 
(e.g. capacity to collect and store the goods and to 
protect the equipment). The most important, di-
rect and tangible losses are destruction of goods 
and shop equipments but also interruption of the 
businesses.





< 2 500 6 8 950 0.68
2 501 – 5 000 7 27 670 2.09
5 001 – 12 500 21 184 475 13.96
12 501 – 25 000 16 289 485 21.90
25 001 – 50 000 12 406 020 30.72
>50 000 5 405 115 30.65
Total 67 1 321 715 100.00
Source: Amarante Commercial Association (2001)
Fig. 9. Area flooded the 21st of March 2001.
Source: Câmara Municipal de Amarante [Amarante City Hall].
Fig. 10. Losses associated to direct damages during the flood 
21st of March.
Source: Amarante Commercial Association (2001).
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The questionnaire implemented in 2009, found 
six shops owners that did not have the experi-
ence of the 2000/2001 floods because they were 
not yet established in the area. As a response to 
the questionnaire 18 answers were obtained and 
for most of them the 21st of March flood was ef-
fectively the most important event of that win-
ter, which caused the highest losses, maintained 
more people and for longer period stayed out of 
their residence or work place (most of them be-
tween 12 hours and 18 hours). However, many of 
the inquired people recovered in a week or less 
than a month and only for three people it took 
several months. Even though, some individu-
als had a previous long experience of managing 
floods, this event surprised them. Also the three 
questionnaire responders working within the 
study area for more than 20 years did not think 
that the occurrence of flood with such high water 
height was possible.
The people are conscientious that there is a 
high probability to be affected by floods which 
are not considered as excessively destructive. 
Even though these events occur sporadically the 
residents and/or shop owners consider that pre-
paredness is fundamental to decrease the dam-
ages and it is not a big disturbance for them to 
prepare for floods.
People start to think about the floods when the 
autumn arrives but their attention increases with 
rainfall intensity. To pay attention to the meteoro-
logical forecasts, the civil protection information 
and alerts broadcasted by radio and television 
are referred as usual procedures. Despite general 
awareness and concern, two of the inquired re-
ferred only thinking about floods when their oc-
currence is imminent.
Most of the inquired people feel themselves as 
sufficiently prepared, nevertheless classified their 
neighbors’ preparedness inferior and even lower 
the preparedness of the civil protection agents 
(Table 7). About 58% of the inquired considered 
having the sufficient information to prepare for 
a flood event. It is fundamentally a result of past 
experiences. The family, friends and the media 
are also important sources of information. Only 
four (22%) of the inquired referred that they re-
ceive each year information about flood possibil-
ity and prevention measures from the Municipal 
Civil Protection Service.
After the experience of the 21st of March flood, 
less than 50% of the inquired considered them-
selves more prepared to face a similar event. On 
the one hand it is a consequence of a lack of in-
formation to support preparedness. On the other 
hand, even though they have information, there 
are some limitations that hinder the prepared-
Table 7. Preparedness of citizens to floods









Floods are too destructive in order for me to take care about them 1.62 0.77
The probability that a flood might affect me is low 2.46 1.33
Prepare myself for the floods is a great inconvenient 2.46 1.27
There is no advantages in preparing me for the floods as they hap-
pen sporadically 2.50 1.16
It is difficult for me to prepare for the floods 3.07 1.21
Prepare for the floods reduces significantly the risks 4.08 1.04
I am conveniently prepared to face floods 3.38 0.87
Preparedness im-
provement ³
Develop a joint action with my neighbours in order to prevent the 
impacts of a future flood 4.00 0.88
Participate in some activity to prevent the impacts of a future flood 
promoted by Municipal Civil Protection 3.62 1.19
Source: Survey, 2009
¹ The variable were coded in a 5 points scale: (1) Not prepared to (5) Very Prepared; ²The variables were coded in a 5 points scale: (1) Disa-
gree totally to (5) Totally Agree; ³ The variables were coded in a 5 points scale: (1) Never to (5) Always.
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ness and also the capacity to cope (e.g. age, peo-
ple alone without employers or family close to 
help, no driving license to easily transport the 
products, stay out of the area). Needless to say, 
that when inhabitants in a region are informed 
about flood coping strategies, they are better pre-
pared for adequate countermeasures (Hansson 
et al. 2008).
The inquired citizens showed a great avail-
ability to develop actions with the neighbours to 
improve preparedness but they are also available 
to participate in activities develop by the Munici-
pal Civil Protection Service. Increase the coopera-
tion between civil Protection and the citizens is 
fundamental to decrease damages.
On the 21st of March 2001 the Municipal Civil 
Protection Service launched a warning through 
direct contact and telephone. Within interrogat-
ed people only five (28%) of the inquired lived 
in the area and as the flood peak occurred dur-
ing the night many shops owners were not in the 
area. The main problem was contacting them by 
mobile phones and only some of them arrived at 
the place, when it was too late to safeguard their 
belongings. The warning time was very depen-
dent on the quality of the forecast, and the way to 
warn shops owners that do not live in Amarante, 
or are not in Amarante at the weekends and holi-
days, continue to be a big challenge that needs to 
be improved.
However, even before the Civil Protection 
flood warning some experienced people recog-
nized the threat posed by the growth of the river 
and began to take some prevention measures 
which was fundamental to decrease the losses. 
By the contrary, other people left the shops with-
out realizing the danger and did not believe that 
another flood may occur.
Even those who believed in the possibility of 
a new flood event did not expect that the 21st of 
March episode would reach such a high level. In 
fact, many people that had put the goods on an 
upper level inside the shop did not have time to 
store them in the uppers floors of buildings or in 
the case of shops without a storage place to trans-
port it outside the flooded area. At that time the 
City Hall had new garbage containers that made 
the traders available to facilitate the storage and 
also helped shop owners in the transportation of 
their products from the affected areas. This mea-
sure contributed to diminish the losses. A lack of 
places to store the products was identified.
Although some people had time to safeguard 
their belongings the damages were high, because 
not all goods and equipment were easy or even 
possible to move away. The destruction of the 
windows and doors was frequent, that explain 
the option of some shop owners, who fixed the 
furniture to the walls and kept the doors open. 
The structural damages were very small. Only 
one shop wall fell down.
People considered family and friends as the 
most important help to deal with flood events. 
However, the Municipal Civil Protection Service, 
the police and mainly the fire-fighters brigade 
were also important.
Nevertheless, the level of trust of the inquired 
citizens in the local institutions is very low, main-
ly in the case of the Municipal Civil Protection 
Service and the company responsible for the dam 
management. The fire-fighters brigade as well as 
police forces had more trust.
The politicians used flood events to promote 
themselves and made promises, but 58% of the 
inquired answered that they did not accomplish 
any of them. It is necessary more coherence and 
responsibility of the politicians to accomplish the 
promises and to make the decision process more 
transparent to the people, identifying the rules 
and methods of decision.
Some of the inquired (15%) declared that af-
ter floods the City Hall did not take any meas-
ure to avoid this kind of occurrences. In this case 
citizens preparedness is fundamental to decrease 
the damages. Although, some improvements 
could be done for a more rapid and efficient flood 
warning. Concerning the Municipal Civil Protec-
tion Service the monitoring of water height and 
the meteorological forecasts are fundamental to 
establish the appropriate moment to launch the 
warning as well as the readiness of the response. 
The collaboration with several institutions (e.g. 
fire-fighters brigade, police, EDP, National Civil 
Protection Authority) was evaluated by the City 
Hall as very good. Nevertheless some improve-
ments are still possible. It is also fundamental to 
reinforce the contact between the citizens and the 
Municipal Civil Protection Service as well as the 
others civil protection agents in order to establish 
an operational plan to support the emergency 
 flood mAnAgement strAtegies in frequent And smAll scAle eVents: lessons leArned from AmArAnte (portugAl) 83
management. Without a strong engagement of 
the citizens in all the process, the risk will not 
decrease. The City Hall has an Emergency Plan 
approved in 1999 and reviewed in 2007 without 
any changes concerning flood management. The 
21st of March  2001 flood management experi-
ence was not included in the plan and used to 
improve future response. In fact, sometimes in 
Portugal, the most important thing is to imple-
ment a “politically correct” emergency manage-
ment plan following the framework defined by 
the law instead of an effective risk and disaster 
management. 
The capacity to recover is connected with per-
sonal attributes (e.g. financial resources) but also 
with the actuation of different institutions. Most 
of the affected people used their own resources 
to recover. The financial sector promoted a subsi-
dized credit line, but most of the people did not 
use it because they did not see any advantages 
on it.
The support of the insurance companies was 
evaluated differently which could be related with 
the established agreements. In fact, if six of the in-
quired were satisfied, five complained about the 
help from the insurance companies and most of 
them classified the insurance company support 
as very bad. The shop owners established in the 
area for a long time have insurance agreements 
but the newly arriving citizens are not able to 
evaluate such agreements.
The 21st of March 2001 flood was an extreme 
event with a magnitude unknown in the area, 
that increased the vulnerability of the people and 
mainly the shop owners. The capacity to cope 
and to recover was determined by several is-
sues, namely by the perception of the danger, the 
capabilities of each one to take preparedness or 
emergency procedures, and the coordination of 
the different entities involved in the flood man-
agement. 
conclusions
The 2000/2001 winter was effectively an ex-
ceptional year concerning the amount of rain-
fall and the occurrence of floods. The historical 
floods and rainfall data support this conclusion. 
We did not find any year with so many events of 
level II or higher as well as with so many follow-
ing days with at least a level I floods. The 21st of 
March 2001 daily maximum of precipitation for 
Amarante (100.4 mm) is the second highest ever 
recorded. Between 1st of October 2001 and the 
end of March 2001 precipitation amount reached 
1923.3 mm. This was a value higher by 21% than 
the highest previously registered.
The experience of 21st of March 2001 flood re-
inforces the importance of decreasing the time to 
implement the warning of flood, so that people 
can have more time to safeguard their goods. 
This entails that better information forecasting 
water discharge and precipitation as well as a 
better cooperation between several public and 
private institutions is needed. In addition, an ef-
fective early warning implies that flood endan-
gered people would be able to receive and under-
stand it easily.
As people have different perceptions of floods 
and of the way to deal with these events, a more 
detailed work on information and its transfor-
mation in effective action must be implemented. 
Only through a better cooperation between Mu-
nicipal Civil Protection Service and local commu-
nity it will be possible to reduce the damages.
As the highest floods are not annual events 
and the lessons learned from the 21st of March 
2001 flood were not integrated in Municipal 
Emergency Plan, so some benefits from this ex-
perience will not upgrade a future flood manage-
ment response. The reason of such a situation 
is that people learning from this event may not 
have the same functions in the City Hall or can 
move away, and consequently the benefits of the 
experience are lost. 
At the same time in the Amarante flood risk 
prone area after 2001 new shops appeared, mean-
ing that there are more exposed elements. Last 
year an alert of flood that remained only at level I 
put into evidence the lack of knowledge of these 
new inhabitants. A better communication be-
tween Municipal Civil Protection Service and the 
citizens as well as a higher responsibility and en-
gagement of the local community in flood man-
agement will contribute to decrease the losses.
The simple model of classification of floods 
presented in this paper, identify six levels and 
certainly each one is associated with a probabili-
ty of occurrence, with different exposed elements 
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and potential damages as well as diverse emer-
gency management procedures. It is our inten-
tion to apply this approach in other places with 
different morphology and flood characteristics 
in order to analyze the interest and applicability 
of the concept to support flood management and 
risk reduction.
The information about flood hazard is indis-
pensable to inform the population and stake-
holders about the local risk, for planning of flood 
control measures and for benefit-cost analyses of 
these measures (Büchele et al. 2006). However, 
it is not sufficient. The improvement of vulner-
ability knowledge is fundamental to support the 
process in which decision-makers choose the best 
procedures for risk reduction. It is fundamental 
to focus on developing responses that are effec-
tive in facing uncertainty about the likelihood of 
high level floods occurrence. Responses should 
be in the form of processes capable of incorporat-
ing new knowledge as it emerges (Handmer et 
al. 1999) as well as incorporate the lessons from 
the past experiences, effectively learned and not 
only lived. In fact, learning from the experience 
can give a great contribution to improve risk re-
duction and disaster management. However, this 
is not an instinctively and automatic process. It 
implies a post-event analysis and evaluation fol-
lowed by the integration of new procedures, not 
only in the institutional level (e.g. emergency 
planning) but also in the citizens’ preparedness.
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